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Policy conclusions
The Malawi Government Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Programme as implemented in •	
2006/7 was very costly, but is capable of generating benefit:cost ratios between 0.76 
and 1.36 (a ratio of 1 represents a “break even” point), not allowing for  “second-round” 
growth effects.
Major determinants of programme impact include clear understanding of programme •	
objectives (increased wages, reduced food prices, growth and diversification) and 
trade-offs, extent and effectiveness of subsidy targeting, timeliness in implementation, 
programme scale and cost, extent of public/private sector partnership, and policy 
makers’ access to and use of reliable and timely information. 
Programme impact is also vulnerable to factors either partially or completely outside •	
government control, including variations in international fertiliser and maize prices 
and weather.
Andrew Dorward, Ephraim Chirwa, Duncan Boughton, Eric 
Crawford, Thom Jayne, Rachel Slater, Valerie Kelly and 
Maxton Tsoka
The recent spike in international food and fertilizer prices has underlined the vulnerability of  poor urban and rural households in many developing countries, especially in Africa.  The combination of factors that resulted in this spike has renewed policymakers’ focus on the need to increase staple 
food crop productivity.  While the pros and cons of input subsidies have been hotly 
debated over the past decade, input subsidies are being introduced (or re-introduced) 
in several countries as a means to shore up food security in the short-term while also 
implementing longer-term investments to raise productivity.  With fertilizer prices 
likely to remain high in the short to medium term, such subsidies will inevitably imply 
a high budgetary burden.  The challenge is to design so-called “smart” input  subsidy 
programmes that have a significant impact on the availability of food in the short 
run while stimulating growth and rural development and increasing (or at least not 
suppressing) effective demand for and commercial distribution of inputs in the long 
run.  Beginning in 2005/6, after almost a decade of experience with smaller-scale 
subsidy programmes, Malawi introduced a large-scale input  subsidy programme using 
vouchers. The purpose of this brief is to review Malawi’s experience in order to identify 
the challenges facing “smart” subsidy programmes if they are to be sustainable and 
cost effective in delivering on their goals.
Towards ‘smart’ subsidies in 
agriculture? Lessons from recent 
experience in Malawi
Natural Resource Perspectives
2
Introduction
Agricultural input subsidies were common in poor rural 
economies in the 1960s and 70s, and a major element in 
Asia’s green revolution. However, conventional wisdom among 
policy analysts in the 1980s and 90s was that subsidies 
had been ineffective and inefficient policy instruments in 
Africa, contributing to government over-spending and fiscal 
and macro-economic problems. Recent years have seen a 
resurgence of interest in these subsidies in Africa, together 
with the emergence of ‘smart subsidies’, innovative delivery 
systems intended to reduce common problems facing subsidy 
programmes and to extend their benefits. 
The evolving implementation of a large-scale seed and 
fertiliser subsidy in Malawi has attracted considerable 
international attention. This policy brief presents the major 
findings of an in-depth evaluation of the 2006/7 subsidy 
programme.
Background
The implementation and impacts of the 2006/7 Agricultural 
Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) in Malawi have to be 
understood in the context of widespread rural poverty and food 
insecurity, vulnerable agriculture-based livelihoods, low and 
variable agricultural productivity, severe liquidity constraints 
to fertiliser use, and a long-standing history of smallholder 
agricultural input subsidies in Malawi. 
Poverty in Malawi is pervasive and predominantly rural with a 
national poverty head count of 52% in 2004/5 and 94% of poor 
people living in rural areas (NSO, 2005). Poverty and limited 
land availability means that the great majority of the poor are 
food-deficit small-scale farmers: their food security and real 
incomes are heavily dependent on low-input production of 
maize (the dominant staple in most parts of the country) on 
small land holdings with declining soil fertility, as well as on 
casual labouring and other income earning opportunities for 
significant parts of the year when they have to buy food. At 
these times their real incomes and ability to purchase food 
are highly sensitive to maize prices, which change dramatically 
between and within seasons. During the last 10 years such 
farmers have faced both chronic and acute food insecurity 
problems with national food shortages due to poor production 
seasons and reliance on late and expensive government and 
donor-funded food staple imports.
Farmers are well aware of the potential for hybrid seed and 
fertilisers to increase their maize production, but purchases 
of both are limited by supply constraints (poor and/or costly 
parastatal and private distribution systems to rural areas) and 
major profitability and affordability constraints on demand. 
High fertiliser prices, high maize price variation and a range of 
agronomic and crop management constraints on maize yields 
lead to limited profitability of fertiliser use on maize. Value:cost 
ratios (VCRs) of 2 or more are generally recognised as the 
minimum for profitable investment in fertilisers, but figure 
1 shows that VCRs over the last ten years have been highly 
variable, particularly when maize is valued at pre-harvest prices 
(the value of maize to deficit, buying households) and almost 
always below 2 when maize is valued at post-harvest prices 
(the value of maize households with a surplus to sell). Deficit 
households for whom fertiliser use on maize is most profitable 
also face severe “affordability” problems – they are very short 
of cash with which to buy fertilisers, credit is perceived as 
risky and difficult or costly to obtain, and there are limited 
opportunities to buy fertilisers in bags smaller than 50kg: in 
2003/4 the cost of one 50kg bag of fertiliser was around 10% 
of median per capita annual rural expenditure.  
It is not surprising that in this context agricultural input 
subsidies have a long history and major political and economic 
significance in Malawi. General price subsidies on smallholder 
maize seed and fertilisers, were, with subsidised credit, a 
major component of Malawi’s agricultural development policy 
during the 1970s and 80s.The withdrawal of these subsidies 
has been followed by their fitful reintroduction in response to 
Policy conclusions cont’d...
The voucher or coupon system can be an effective way of rationing and targeting subsidy access to maximise incremental •	
production and economic and social gains, with opportunities for innovative public/private partnerships to develop 
input supply and demand systems – but there are many practical and political challenges in programme design and 
implementation to increase efficiency, control costs and limit patronage and fraud. 
Other countries looking at Malawi’s experience must identify interactions between the potential benefits of input •	
subsidies, socio-agro-ecological conditions, critical programme features needed for achievement of benefits, and the 
costs and risks of failure.
Input subsidies are not a quick fix for dealing with high food and fertiliser prices: their design and sustainable •	
implementation must promote smallholders’ incremental access to and productive use of inputs, build sustainable 
demand and private sector supply, and be integrated with other policies for increasing agricultural productivity, rural 
development and management of incremental production to provide rural people with reliable improvements in food 
access and real incomes.
3maize shortages, changing political pressures, rising domestic 
fertiliser prices, and low maize productivity.  Restrictions 
on private sector trading in maize and fertilisers were also 
removed in the 1990s, but parastatal and humanitarian 
interventions in these markets have continued. Beginning 
in 1998, first universal “starter packs” and then “targeted 
inputs” of free packs of fertiliser and matching maize seed for 
0.1ha of land were distributed. Maize production and prices 
fluctuated wildly, however, and combined with high fertiliser 
prices led to the low and variable VCRs presented in Figure 1 
and discussed earlier.
The 2005/6 subsidy programmes: 
implementation and results
The major candidates in the 2004 presidential elections 
all made manifesto commitments to fertiliser subsidies. 
Poor rainfall, and late distribution and limited scope of the 
targeted inputs programme for the 2004/5 season, resulted 
in low national maize production in 2005.  With slow official 
importation and emergency response measures, this low 
production translated into very serious food shortages and 
high maize prices in 2005/6. The government then introduced 
a large-scale input subsidy in the 2005/06 season with the 
stated objectives of promoting access to and use of fertilizers 
in both maize and tobacco production in order to increase 
agricultural productivity and food security.  Distribution of 
fertilisers was to be handled entirely by parastatals, due in 
large part to distrust between government and the private 
sector associated with the limited 2004/5 input subsidy 
programme.
The subsidy was implemented through the distribution 
of coupons for four fertilizer types which recipients could 
redeem at parastatal outlets at approximately one-third of the 
normal cash price. In addition, 6,000 tons of OPV maize seed 
were also offered for sale at a similar discount, but without 
coupons. There was considerable local variation in the criteria 
for the selection of beneficiaries, the proportion of people 
receiving coupons, and the number of coupons received per 
recipient household. A total of 131,000 tonnes of subsidized 
fertilizer were sold, all by two parastatals, with private sector 
involvement limited to importation of part of the total. Direct 
costs of the programme (excluding overhead costs) were 
reported to be MK7.2 billion against a budget of MK5.1 billion. 
This was financed from the government budget, supported 
by direct budgetary support. Reported 2005/6 private sector 
fertilizer sales were considerably lower than sales in the 
previous year  and several of the main private sector fertiliser 
distribution chains reported significant financial losses as a 
result of lower commercial sales and their exclusion from the 
programme. These problems were particularly serious for a 
large part of the small-scale independent agro-dealer network. 
Incremental fertilizer use on maize as a result of the subsidy 
was estimated to be a little over 100,000 tonnes. This increase, 
coupled with good rains, led to a bumper harvest.
Figure 1: Maize and Nitrogen Value Cost Ratios, 1997-2007
Source: SOAS et al (2008)
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The 2006/7 subsidy programme: 
implementation and impacts
The programme was implemented again in the following 
(2006/7) season, but this time with some donor financial 
support, greater involvement of the private sector in subsidised 
input sales, and greater choice of varieties of subsidized maize 
seed for farmers.  Two million seed and 3 million fertiliser 
coupons were budgeted for the 2006/7 programme and 
allocated to districts and sub-districts, with a subsequent 
distribution of more than 1 million unbudgeted ‘supplementary’ 
fertiliser coupons. There were reports of substantial diversion 
of coupons in some areas, but few large-scale confirmed 
cases. Farmers paid roughly 28% of the full fertiliser cost, with 
government paying the remainder. 
A total of 175,000 tonnes of subsidised maize and tobacco 
fertilisers were sold (against the redemption of 3.5 million 
coupons), with just under 50,000 tonnes sold by six private 
companies. 4,500 tonnes of maize hybrid and OPV maize seed 
were sold (57% by private retailers, including small agrodealers). 
Late disbursement of inputs in the southern region (due to late 
fertilizer procurement, late issue of coupons, and late opening 
of markets), together with stock-outs in some markets, led to 
many farmers spending long periods queuing for their inputs, 
delaying planting and/or fertilizer applications. 
Direct programme cost to government and donors was 
just under US$91 million, with 87% funded by the Malawi 
Government. Fertiliser sales were 17% over budget (due to 
the issue of supplementary coupons) and total Government 
expenditure was 25% over budget (which was already 40% of 
the Ministry of Agriculture budget and over 5% of the national 
budget). Following estimates of a very large national maize 
harvest in 2007, Government agreed to exports of 400,000 
tons of maize to Zimbabwe during 2007/8, although traders 
were subsequently only able to source and export around 
300,000 tons. 
Formal evaluation of the 2006/7 programme identified the 
following benefits:
Increased maize output•	 : the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food Security (MoAFS) estimated total maize production 
of 2.7 and 3.4 million tonnes in 2005/6 and 2006/7 
respectively, both record harvests and markedly higher 
than the 1.2 million tonne estimate for 2004/5. But whereas 
maize prices were very low following the 2005/6 harvest, 
as would be expected following a record harvest, the much 
higher prices following the 2006/7 harvest suggest that 
maize production was over-estimated.  Furthermore, the 
good rains in both years mean that not all of the increases in 
production can be attributed to the subsidy programme.
Improved household food security•	 : Rural households’ own 
subjective rankings of their economic well-being were 8% 
higher in May/June 2007 (before food prices started rising 
later in the season) than in 2004.
Increased private sector participation•	  in seed and fertiliser 
retail sales under the 2006/7 programme relative to 
2005/6 (although small independent agro-dealers were 
still excluded from subsidised fertiliser sales) allowed for 
a partial financial recovery and increased optimism.
Cost-benefit analysis of the 2006/7 programme showed that 
impacts are highly sensitive to management and to external 
conditions, but that with good management the program could 
yield favourable economic returns (although it was not possible 
to compare the programme’s rate of return with alternative 
longer term public investments). Estimated benefit:cost ratios 
ranged from 0.76 to 1.36 with impacts, costs and effective use 
of scarce government resources in such programmes depending 
upon:
Displacement of unsubsidised sales•	  - the extent to which 
subsidized fertilizer displace purchases which farmers 
would make anyway without the subsidy;
Incremental maize production•	 , which is determined by 
displacement, timeliness and method of use, variety / 
fertiliser interactions, and rainfall;
Coupon targeting•	 , which affects direct benefits to poorer 
households, fertilizer displacement, incremental maize 
output, and maize prices and wage rate impacts; and
National and regional maize prices•	   and the extent to which 
additional output lowers maize prices and makes grain more 
affordable to low-income households.
Financial analysis of government costs and returns found that 
net returns are very sensitive to displacement rates, and the 
programme cannot be justified solely by its contribution to 
reducing government financing of food imports in years of poor 
production: other approaches to securing grain supplies and 
price stabilisation may be more efficient and effective than a 
subsidy programme. Implementation of the programme does 
not appear to have had adverse effects on macroeconomic 
stability or on budgetary allocations to other sectors, but its 
staffing demands on the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security and on local government have affected the delivery 
of other services.
Impact evaluation also needs to take into account the benefits 
not included in the above analysis: stimulus or constraints to 
private sector input supply, especially for currently under-
served areas, and the benefits of transfers and lower maize 
prices in stimulating “second round” farm and non-farm 
growth. Impacts of the programme on the welfare and resilience 
of poor households (often referred to as social protection 
impacts) include a higher degree of food self-sufficiency 
among deficit producers, higher volumes of marketed maize 
resulting in downward pressure on maize prices to the benefit 
of food purchasers, and higher wages and farm and non-farm 
employment. Such benefits are critically important in the 
context of high rates of poverty, vulnerability, food insecurity 
and dependence upon low-productivity maize production 
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among rural people in Malawi. Such potential benefits from 
the 2006/7 programme were unfortunately undermined by the 
high 2007/8 maize prices, following exports prompted by over 
estimates of maize production and stocks. 
Conclusions and Policy Lessons
Experience from the 2005/6 and 2006/7 programmes suggests 
that there is considerable potential for Malawi to improve on 
the outcomes from the program. There are also, however, 
substantial dangers that without explicit action to improve 
effectiveness and control its costs the programme could 
become an unsustainable drain on resources. These dangers 
are likely to be exacerbated by recent dramatic increases in 
international fertiliser prices (Dorward and Poulton, 2008). 
The following key issues need attention.
Programme objectives, policy coordination and 
complementary investments: A comprehensive and consistent 
framework of objectives is needed to resolve potentially 
conflicting objectives and to allow appropriate targets and 
budgets to be set for long and short-term plans. Greater 
emphasis is needed on setting the programme within wider 
agricultural and national development strategies. Particular 
issues arise with maize market and price policies, social 
protection policies and programmes, and complementary 
investments in rural roads and in agricultural research and 
extension.  If maize market interventions lead to high domestic 
prices (as occurred with maize exports in 2007/8) then this 
seriously undermines positive subsidy programme impacts on 
food security, social protection and rural economic growth. 
Paradoxically even interventions intended to reduce prices 
often have unintended consequences that result in higher 
prices.  Similarly, poor roads and lack of agricultural research 
and extension limit the effectiveness of the programme in 
raising farm productivity. Adequate investments must be 
made in these areas and the scale of the AISP limited and its 
implementation made more cost-effective so that it does not 
starve other investments of resources. Improved coordination 
between the input subsidy and other safety net programmes 
could facilitate more efficient local coupon allocation, 
distribution and redemption mechanisms.
Targeting and displacement of commercial fertilizer 
purchases: National and household-level estimates suggest 
that in 2006/7 between 30 and 40% of subsidized fertiliser 
purchases displaced commercial purchases rather than 
adding to total purchases. Such displacement undermines 
private sector viability and transfers scarce government 
funds to less poor farmers with reduced developmental 
benefits from the programme. A positive correlation between 
displacement and household wealth and land holding in 
2006/7 suggests that displacement can be reduced by 
targeting subsidies more effectively to poorer famers, and 
by more timely and transparent programme implementation 
to help farmers better plan their commercial purchases. 
An alternative to administratively complex and sensitive 
targeting within villages could be to provide a smaller 
subsidy to all rural households across the country or to all 
rural households in selected geographical areas whose agro-
economic conditions offer the greatest economic returns to 
input subsidies (although the latter might pose particular 
political difficulties).  
Scale and cost control: Year on year increases in both 
the scale of the programme and the prices of inputs have 
led to burgeoning costs and fiscal outlays (these continued 
in 2007/8). The programme is a major item in the national 
budget and has also gone over budget in all three years of its 
implementation as a result of both price and (except in 2005/6) 
physical input distribution overruns. Increases in programme 
scale are likely to lead to increasing displacement and hence 
declining returns to increasing costs, particularly in the context 
of recent dramatic increases in international fertiliser prices 
(2008/9 urea prices are more than 2.5 times the 2006/7 
price).  Programme scale and cost need to be limited, together 
with more effective targeting and efficient implementation, 
to ensure efficient resource use and to release resources for 
alternative and complementary investments.
Agricultural sector and programme information needs: 
There are fundamental information gaps that prevent effective 
planning and management of the AISP and of agricultural 
and rural programmes. Discrepancies between MoAFS and 
NSO estimates of farm families and rural households are very 
problematic. Reliable, rigorous information on smallholder 
production of major crops and of national stocks, flows 
and consumption of staples is also critically important for 
agricultural and food security and market monitoring and 
policy.
Engagement of the private sector and timely, transparent 
implementation: Although the private sector’s 2006/7 
market share increased over 2005/06, it has the capacity to 
supply much greater quantities. Allowing the private sector 
to supply more in future would enhance its viability as well 
as enable the government to reduce programme costs. In the 
past, investments in the agro-dealer network have supported 
increased competition and improved farmer access to low-
cost inputs, particularly in under-served areas. Increased 
participation of agro-dealers in 2006/7 and 2007/8 needs 
to be continued. Uncertainties about subsidy programme 
modalities from year to year also depress the incentives for 
suppliers and farmers to invest in unsubsidised fertilizer 
procurement, and often delay subsidy implementation and 
reduce its effectiveness. Greater consistency, transparency 
and timeliness in planning and implementation is needed 
from government, as well as commitment from all stakeholders 
to a ‘transition strategy’ for greater private sector involvement 
in input markets in under-served locations. 
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Flexibility and learning: Programme consistency 
is important for developing administrative capacity 
in programme administration and for nurturing 
investment confidence among farmers and 
private input suppliers, However the programme 
also needs to evolve, responding to changing 
conditions, identifying and implementing  ways 
of improving efficiency and effectiveness, and 
keeping one step ahead of the many opportunists 
looking to defraud the system. The Government 
has shown an admirable willingness to work 
with partners to develop and try new ways of 
working to improve the programme. Nevertheless 
managing transition, flexibility, and learning while 
maintaining consistency, stability and long-term 
commitment is a major challenge.  
Lessons for other countries
Decisions to implement similar subsidy 
programmes in other countries need to clearly 
identify programme benefits and objectives 
(with potential positive or negative interactions 
between them), and to establish (a) the potential 
for achieving these objectives (given the extent 
and nature of household vulnerability, food and 
input markets, and potential agronomic benefits 
of increased input use), and (b) critical features of 
subsidy programme design needed for effective 
and efficient achievement of objectives. Potential 
benefits then need to be weighed against the 
opportunity cost of resources allocated to the 
programme, particularly investments in long-
term food staple productivity growth, and the 
risks of failure (involving, for example, difficulties 
in controlling costs, dangers of fraud and/or 
subsidy capture, displacement, high fertiliser 
costs, and bad weather). These issues must 
then be given significant attention in programme 
design and implementation (see SOAS et al, 
2008, for a full discussion). High international 
fertiliser prices and likely increased weather 
uncertainty as a result of global climate change 
pose particular challenges and dangers – but 
may also, paradoxically, increase the potential 
gains from effective subsidy implementation. 
They also increase the importance and urgency 
of investment in promotion of wider measures for 
increasing soil health and fertility. 
It is important that input subsidies should not 
be seen as a quick fix for dealing with high food 
prices: important and over-riding principles in 
their design and implementation should be that 
they lead to incremental access to and productive 
use of inputs by smallholder farmers, that they 
should build sustainable smallholder input 
demand and private sector input supply, and that 
there be careful consideration of the management 
of incremental production to provide rural people 
with reliable improvements in food access and 
real incomes.   
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